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Abraham Lincoln and  
the Cardinal Virtue of  
Practical Reason 




Practical wisdom is an elusive concept.  This Article focuses on a 
case in which Abraham Lincoln, prior to his election as President, 
participated (or more accurately did not participate) to frame a dis-
cussion of what practical wisdom means and how it makes a differ-
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I. LINCOLN’S MOST IMPORTANT CASE 
I’d like to tell you about what was arguably Abraham Lincoln’s most im-
portant case as a practicing lawyer.  As odd as it may seem, Lincoln didn’t 
even actually participate in the case, and it may have marked his deepest hu-
miliation as a lawyer.  It was Lincoln’s response to this lawsuit—years later—
that makes it so significant. 
McCormick v. Manny involved a patent infringement charge brought in 
1854 by Cyrus McCormick, the inventor of the grain harvesting mechanical 
reaper, against the John Manny Company of Rockford, Illinois.1  The McCor-
mick reaper, developed in the early 1830s and patented in 1834, revolution-
ized agriculture, but at the Paris Exhibition in 1855, a competitor, the Manny 
reaper, beat the McCormick reaper in a head-to-head contest.2  McCormick 
responded in fine American fashion by filing a lawsuit, claiming the Manny 
reaper violated its patent.3 
The stakes for the companies, and even for the future of the U.S. econ-
omy, were enormous.4  Both sides wheeled in the heavy guns.  The Manny 
Company hired George Harding, a patent specialist from Philadelphia with a 
national reputation.5  The lawyers representing McCormick included former 
Attorney General Reverdy Johnson and Edward Dickerson of New York.6 
Since the trial was slated to take place in Illinois, the defendants believed 
that Judge Thomas Drummond of the United States Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois would likely be assigned to hear the case.7  Harding decided 
to recruit a local attorney who “understood the judge and had his confidence,” 
even though he doubted a frontier lawyer could provide any real assistance.8  
When Harding’s first choice was unavailable, he set his sights on Abraham 
 
 1. McCormick v. Manny, 15 F. Cas. 1314, 1315 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1856), aff’d sub. nom. McCormick 
v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402 (1857).  There are many good accounts of the Reaper Case.  One of the best is 
in Doris Kearns Goodwin’s magnificent Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln, 
from which this description is largely drawn.  See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE 
POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 173–75 (2005).  I have also utilized David Herbert Don-
ald’s biography of Lincoln.  See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN (1995). 
 2. McCormick, 15 F. Cas. at 1316 (supporting the patent assertion). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Joseph Gies, The Great Reaper War, 5 AM. HERITAGE: INNOVATION & TECH. 20 (1990), 
http://www.inventionandtech.com/content/great-reaper-war-1. 
 5. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 173; DONALD, supra note 1, at 185. 
 6. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 173. 
 7. DONALD, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
 8. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 173; DONALD, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
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Lincoln.9 
Still stinging from his loss six months earlier to Lyman Trumbull in the 
1854 Senate contest, participating in such a high-profile contest was a wel-
come opportunity for Lincoln.10  He was paid a retainer of four hundred dol-
lars, sizeable by his standards, and was thrilled with the prospect of going up 
against lawyers of the caliber and renown of Reverdy Johnson and Edward 
Dickerson.11 
But not long after Lincoln was retained, the venue was shifted from Chi-
cago to Cincinnati, which eliminated Lincoln’s usefulness in the eyes of Har-
ding.12  Harding responded to this news by teaming up with the lawyer he 
really wanted, the brilliant up-and-coming Edwin Stanton of Pittsburgh.13 
Not knowing of the change of locale, or indeed of Harding’s narrow rea-
sons for hiring him, Lincoln went to work.14  Harding did not even send Lin-
coln a copy of the pleadings, as promised, and Lincoln’s written pleas for in-
formation went unacknowledged.15  Ever resourceful, Lincoln obtained copies 
on his own from the federal courthouse when he had business in Chicago.16  
He also went to the Manning headquarters in Rockford to examine first-hand 
the reaping machine at the center of the dispute.17 
Eventually, Lincoln learned from the newspapers where and when the 
trial was scheduled, and although he had not heard a word from Harding, he 
arrived in Cincinnati with a lengthy brief, ready for battle.18  He tracked down 
the lawyers at a guest house where they were staying, just as they were leaving 
for court.19  Neither Harding nor Stanton would give Lincoln the time of day.20  
Years later, Harding recalled his shock at seeing the “tall rawly boned, un-
gainly back woodsman, with coarse, ill-fitting clothing, . . . holding in his 
hands a blue cotton umbrella with a ball on the end of the handle.”21  Stanton 
 
 9. DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 10. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 173; DONALD, supra note 1, at 185. 
 11. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174; DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 12. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174; DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 13. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174. 
 14. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174; DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 15. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174; DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 16. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174; DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 17. DONALD, supra note 1, at 186. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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was possibly even less impressed and more caustic.  Stanton pulled Harding 
aside and said, “Why did you bring that [damned] long armed Ape here . . . he 
does not know any thing [sic] and can do you no good.”22 
At Stanton’s insistence, Lincoln withdrew from the case, but remarkably, 
he decided to stay in Cincinnati to listen to the arguments.23  Harding did not 
even look at Lincoln’s brief, “so sure that it would be only trash.”24  Heaping 
insult upon indignity, after the trial, it was returned to Lincoln in the envelope 
in which he delivered it, unopened.25  When the judge assigned to the case, 
future U.S. Supreme Court Justice John McLean, invited the lawyers on both 
sides to his house for dinner, Lincoln was excluded.26 
For his part, Lincoln was impressed with the lawyers on both sides, and 
in particular, with Stanton.27  Lincoln stood in “rapt attention . . . drinking in 
his words.”28  According to Lincoln, he had never “seen anything so finished 
and elaborated, and so thoroughly prepared.”29  Lincoln realized that these 
lawyers were in a different league than him, and although he had been prac-
ticing for twenty years, he vowed to return home “to study law.”30 
Due in no part to Lincoln, Manny won the case.  Lincoln left Cincinnati 
chastened, and even returned the balance of his fee (which he eventually 
cashed after the Philadelphia lawyers sent it again with a note telling Lincoln 
he had earned it).31  Lincoln did not talk much about the incident, although he 
did admit to his partner William Herndon that he had been “roughly handled 
by that man Stanton.”32 
A short six years later, Lincoln had been elected President of the United 
States, and it was Edwin Stanton to whom he offered the post of secretary of 
war during the dark days of the Civil War.33  Doris Kearns Goodwin describes 
this astonishing decision: 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 174. 
 25. 2 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIRIE YEARS 42 (1926). 
 26. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 175. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. DONALD, supra note 1, at 186–87. 
 33. GOODWIN, supra note 1, at 175. 
[Vol. 47: 341, 2020] Abraham Lincoln and the Cardinal Virtue 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
346 
Unimaginable as it might seem, after Stanton’s bearish behavior, at 
their next encounter six years later, Lincoln would offer Stanton “the 
most powerful civilian post within his gift”—the post of secretary of 
war.  Lincoln’s choice of Stanton would reveal . . . a singular ability 
to transcend personal vendetta, humiliation, or bitterness.  As for 
Stanton, despite his initial contempt for the “long armed Ape,” he 
would not only accept the offer but come to respect and love Lincoln 
more than any person outside of his immediate family.34 
In a similar magnanimous gesture, Lincoln appointed Harding head of the Pa-
tent Office.35 
II. PRACTICAL WISDOM 
I have elsewhere defended the view that legal reasoning involves an inte-
gration of craft, rhetoric, and practical wisdom.36  Craft is the art of making; 
rhetoric, the art of persuading; and practical wisdom, the art of exercising 
good judgment.  My focus here will be on practical wisdom. 
Practical wisdom is not best understood as a theory, and indeed in some 
sense it may be viewed as an anti-theory, since it cannot be reduced to a sys-
tem of rules.37  Nonetheless, a number of writers have recognized the central-
ity of practical wisdom to adjudication and legal reasoning in general.38  While 
practical wisdom looks to the insights of philosophy, it conceives of legal rea-
soning and adjudication, in an important sense, as an autonomous discipline.39 
 
 34. Id. at 175. 
 35. Id. at 412. 
 36. The material in this section is adapted from my article, The Role of Humility in Exercising 
Practical Wisdom.  See Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 127 (1998). 
 37. Id. at 131 n.15. 
 38. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 109–28 (1993); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 71–78 (1990); 
Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 352 
(1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of 
Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533–41 (1992); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An 
Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1752–54 (1988); Vincent A. Well-
man, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 45 (1985).  Also noteworthy is John Finnis’s discussion of practical reasonableness in JOHN 
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100–33 (1980). 
 39. Scharffs, supra note 36, at 131–32. 
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The primary problem with practical wisdom is that it is almost impossible 
to pin down what it means, much less what its implications are for lawyers or 
judges.  At times, one is tempted to conclude that appeals to the centrality of 
the virtue of practical wisdom should be relegated to law school commence-
ment addresses and funeral orations, occasions for celebrating the vague, in-
spiring, and possibly defunct ideals of the legal profession.  Such a temptation, 
I maintain, should be resisted. 
The view that legal reasoning and, in particular, judicial decision making 
is an exercise in practical wisdom is usually traced back from Aristotle, 
through Edmund Burke, Karl Llewellyn, and Alexander Bickel.40  It has found 
a recent and provocative defense in the work of Yale Law School professor 
and former dean, Anthony Kronman.41  In his noteworthy book, The Lost Law-
yer, Kronman argues that practical wisdom is the lost ideal of the legal pro-
fession, as well as the paradigm for good judicial decision making.42 
What exactly does it mean to have or exercise practical wisdom?  Aristo-
tle’s answer to this question is notoriously cryptic: 
• Aristotle tells us that practical reason is reasoning about what 
should be done on each particular occasion, and involves delib-
eration, desire, choice, and action.43 
• He defines practical wisdom as the virtue of practical reasoning, 
and maintains that virtue is a state of character that lies in a 
mean.44 
But how does the person of practical wisdom decide on the appropriate thing 
to do?  Does she engage in calculations based upon the possible consequences 
of each alternative?  Does she apply certain general principles?  Is it simply a 
matter of exercising commendable all-things-considered judgments?  Aristo-
tle’s answer is not clear, and literally millennia of debate has not resulted in a 
definitive conclusion about what Aristotle’s answer was, to say nothing of 
what the correct answer is. 
 
 40. KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 24–25, 41–43. 
 41. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 38. 
 42. Id. at 3–4. 
 43. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, at 1756–57 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (c. 384 
B.C.E.); KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 41. 
 44. KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 41. 
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Aristotle does say much that is helpful: 
• He observes that choosing what to do involves both deliberation 
and desire, and thus choosing well will involve both deliberating 
well and having the right desires.45 
• Practical reason involves choice and action in concrete, particu-
lar situations, not just apprehending or understanding universal 
rules. 46 
• Aristotle sensibly advises that if we want to know what to do in 
a difficult situation, we should seek the advice of a good and wise 
person.  A person of practical wisdom may be able to give good 
advice about what should be done, even if she cannot explain 
with precision all the reasons for the advice. 47 
• Aristotle also advises that with respect to the most difficult prac-
tical problems, we should be disinclined to trust our own judg-
ments alone, but rather we should reason together with others. 48 
Perhaps most importantly, Aristotle maintains that practical wisdom is a 
synthesis of two different types of virtue—virtue of intellect, and virtue of 
character. 49  Aristotle contrasts practical wisdom with cleverness, the ability 
to “do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and 
to hit it.”50  This may be laudable “if the mark be noble,” but if “the mark be 
bad, the cleverness is mere villainy.”51  The person of practical wisdom will 
be clever, but not merely clever; in addition, he will also have virtue of char-
acter, which will make the aim right.52  Aristotle concludes that “it is not pos-
sible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically 
 
 45. ARISTOTLE, supra note 43. 
 46. See KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 45. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 1807 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (c. 384 
B.C.E.). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1759–60. 
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wise without moral excellence.”53  Thus, practical wisdom is always embod-
ied, particularly in people of a certain sort—individuals who combine excel-
lence in reasoning with the right traits of character and moral equilibrium. 
III. SYMPATHY AND DETACHMENT 
But what are the particular virtues of character that a person of practical 
wisdom will have?  Although Aristotle provides a catalogue of moral virtues, 
he does not articulate which particular habits of character are crucial to prac-
tical wisdom.54  In an attempt to elucidate Aristotle’s thinking, Professor 
Kronman has thoughtfully identified two moral virtues or habits of character 
that will distinguish the person of practical wisdom.55  Kronman begins with 
the observation that deliberative inquiry always involves a measure of moral 
imagination.56  As Kronman puts it, 
A person who is attempting to choose among commensurable goods 
must use imagination to anticipate the costs and benefits of each al-
ternative.  And the person who is deliberating about incomparably 
different options, of the sort we face at crucial turning points in life, 
needs imagination . . . to construct a concrete mental image of the 
choices he might make.57 
Only by exploring, in imagination, the implications and effects of each option 
can we acquire an adequate understanding for making a choice. 
Kronman suggests that the first habit of character needed for imaginative 
deliberation is “a certain measure of sympathy or compassion, in the literal 
sense of ‘feeling with.’”58  Kronman describes sympathy as an attitude mid-
way between observation and identification or endorsement.59  “To sympa-
thize with the values represented by a particular choice is to do more than 
observe their association with a given way of life, to take note of the fact that 
those living the life in question typically affirm values of a certain sort.”60  
 
 53. Id. at 1808. 
 54. KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 45. 
 55. Id. at 70–71. 
 56. Id. at 69. 
 57. KRONMAN, supra note 38, at 69. 
 58. Id. at 70. 
 59. Id. at 71. 
 60. Id. 
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This “may be a first step toward a sympathetic consideration of these values,” 
but genuine sympathy requires more61: 
Only those who have experienced something of the power and appeal 
of a value and who understand why others are drawn to it even if they 
themselves ultimately are not, may be said to have sympathetically 
considered it—to have entertained the value rather than merely noted 
its existence as an anthropological fact.62 
While sympathy goes beyond mere observation, says Kronman, it also 
falls short of outright acceptance: “It is possible to entertain a point of view 
without making it one’s own, in the sense of giving the values associated with 
that point of view one’s full endorsement.”63  Thus, the second habit of char-
acter or virtue that a person of practical wisdom will have is detachment: 
A person who is faced, let us say, with a difficult choice between two 
careers must make an effort to see the claims of each in its best light 
and to feel for himself their power and appeal.  At the same time, he 
must preserve a certain distance or detachment from them.  From 
each imaginative foray into the possible future lives that his choices 
represent, he must be able to withdraw to the standpoint of decision, 
the position he occupies at present.  At least he must be able to do 
this if he is genuinely to choose among the alternatives and not 
merely be swept along by the tide of feeling that any sympathetic 
identification with a particular way of life—even an imagined one—
can arouse.64 
Kronman compares the combination of sympathy and detachment that is 
needed in practical deliberation and decision making to wearing bifocal 
glasses: “Through one lens the alternatives are seen not merely at close range 
but (in contrast to the attitude of observation) from within, from the normative 
and affective points of view that the alternatives themselves afford.  Through 
the other lens, each of the alternatives appears at an equally great distance.”65  
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 72. 
 65. Id. 
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Kronman observes that seeing through bifocal lenses can be difficult and dis-
orienting, and it takes practice to get used to shifting between perspectives 
and combining them in a single field of vision.66  So, too, it is with delibera-
tion: 
It is difficult to be compassionate, and often just as difficult to be 
detached, but what is most difficult of all is to be both at once.  Com-
passion and detachment pull in opposite directions and we are not 
always able to combine them, nor is everyone equally good at doing 
so.67 
Kronman observes that, nonetheless, it is “just this combination of oppos-
ing dispositions that deliberation demands.”68 
IV. JUSTICE, MERCY, HUMILITY 
The most meaningful and formative experience I had as a student at Yale 
Law School was working as Professor Kronman’s research assistant on The 
Lost Lawyer.  One of the most rewarding parts of the job was the weekly ses-
sion that seemed like a graduate seminar, where the roles were reversed, and 
the student got to press and prod the professor on his draft manuscript.  To say 
I benefitted from these tutorials would be a serious understatement.  But, try 
as I might, I could not convince Professor Kronman that there was something 
important missing from his account of practical wisdom.  Perhaps in an effort 
to get me to stand down, one afternoon, he suggested that maybe I had a good 
topic for a law review article.  Whether he was serious or not, I cannot say, 
but I took his advice. 
The first article I wrote as a law professor, The Role of Humility in Exer-
cising Practical Wisdom, argued that Kronman’s claim that sympathy and de-
tachment are the cardinal virtues of practical wisdom is only partly correct.69  
I suggested that Kronman’s advocacy of sympathy in legal terms is translata-
ble into a call for mercy, and that his advocacy of detachment is a call for 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Scharffs, supra note 36. 
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justice.70  Being merciful and just, of course, is central to the ideal of good 
legal judgment, but often the claims of mercy and the claims of justice pull 
us, or even the person of practical wisdom, in different directions.71  Taking 
my cue from a divine lawsuit recounted in the Old Testament book of Micah, 
I argued that there is a third virtue that helps us adjudicate these competing 
claims, and that virtue is humility.72  In the climax of the confrontation be-
tween God and the Children of Israel recounted in Micah 6:1–8, God issues a 
tender and moving injunction: “He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; 
and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, 
and to walk humbly with thy God.”73 
Thus, while Kronman would list sympathy and detachment as the cardinal 
virtues of practical wisdom, my list would be slightly different, and include 
justice, mercy, and humility. 
Psychologists Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Kevin Rathunde reach a sim-
ilar conclusion about the components of practical wisdom.  In The Psychology 
of Wisdom: Evolutionary Interpretation, Csikszentmihalyi and Rathunde 
summarize their view of what empirical research about the psychology of wis-
dom has taught us:  
From work thus far one might tentatively suggest the following: the 
great “width” (empathy), “height” (intelligence), and “depth” (reflec-
tivity) of the wise person allows him or her to form a more complex 
or concrete and abstract perspective on some problem and thus attain 
the possibility of seeing the wisest course of action.74 
Perhaps because I am attracted to visual metaphors, I like this description 
of wisdom as including spatial dimensions of height, breadth, and depth, as-
pects associated with reason, emotion, and an inclination to reflect.  Utilizing 
 
 70. See id. at 134 (arguing that the conflicts that arise from sympathy and detachment “are analo-
gous to the conflicts that arise when one tries to be at once merciful and just”). 
 71. Id. (“While it is commonplace to recognize that we want judges who are both merciful and 
just, it is less common to acknowledge that the requirements of mercy and justice may be in opposition 
to each other.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Micah 6:8 (King James Version). 
 74. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi & Kevin Rathunde, The Psychology of Wisdom: An Evolutionary In-
terpretation, in WISDOM: ITS NATURE, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (Robert J. Stenberg ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1990). 
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different terminology, I would again translate these three capacities or dispo-
sitions, when they are developed in habits that can be counted as traits of char-
acter, as being just, merciful, and humble.  I also appreciate the suggestion 
that exercising practical wisdom often involves something akin to perception 
or seeing. 
V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL WISDOM 
Two additional aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of practical wisdom are 
worth emphasizing.  The first is the distinction Aristotle draws between theo-
retical wisdom (sophia) and practical wisdom (phronesis).75  Theoretical wis-
dom rests upon two concepts, nous, which Aristotle describes as the ability to 
discern reality, and episteme, a type of knowledge that is based upon logic, 
and is sometimes equated with science.76  The point is not that practical wis-
dom is superior to theoretical wisdom; if anything, Aristotle takes the opposite 
point of view.77  But sophia follows from grasping first principles and reason-
ing from them; Aristotle conceives of theoretical wisdom as a kind of deduc-
tive system; it is concerned with things that cannot be otherwise.78  Its primary 
concern is knowledge and truth, whereas practical wisdom is concerned with 
planning, understanding, judgment, and action.79 
For the philosopher, sophia is the nobler, or at least more central, virtue, 
but for the politician and lawyer, phronesis is.80  Practical wisdom reaches 
beyond mere curiosity and the desire to know or understand.81  Curiosity is a 
valuable trait of character for the lawyer, but curiosity is also bounded by the 
particular practical situations a lawyer faces, and the people (the clients, or the 
 
 75. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, at 7–8 (F.H. Peters trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. 1891) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (noting the difference between a life seeking honor through 
practical wisdom and a “life of contemplation”). 
 76. See id. at 12–18 (explaining these concepts, particularly the difference between perceiving and 
“obeying” reason and exercising reason). 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. bk. VI, at 181–82 (explaining that the “scientific or demonstrative” faculty depends on 
invariable factors). 
 79. See generally id. at 182–84 (explaining the broad themes underlying theoretical wisdom and 
practical wisdom). 
 80. See id. at 338–39 (explaining the “of all knowable things those that reason deals with are the 
highest,” but “practical virtues are exercised either in politics or in war”). 
 81. See id. at 339 (noting that a life of theoretical wisdom “alone is desired solely for its own sake; 
for it yields no result beyond the contemplation, but from the practical activities we get something 
more or less besides action”). 
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accused) whose lives are affected in concrete ways by what the lawyer does.82  
Matthew Crawford notes that a mechanic, quite literally, cannot afford to pur-
sue inquiries on the basis of simple curiosity.83  Explains Crawford:  
The problem with such fixation is that the mechanic’s activity, 
properly understood, is practical in character, rather than curious or 
theoretical.  As such it must be disciplined by a circumspect regard 
for others, a kind of fiduciary consciousness.  Amy Gilbert writes that 
practical wisdom entails “the full appreciation of the salient moral 
features of the particular situations we confront.  Our awareness of 
these features enables us to respond properly to them.”  Acquiring 
practical wisdom, then, entails overcoming the self-absorption of the 
idiot, but also the tunnel vision of the curious man whose attention is 
indeed directed outside of himself, but who sees only his own goal.84 
As lawyers, we are always acting as a fiduciary.  This means that we must 
act with a moral awareness of the duties and obligations we owe to others. 85  
The list of others is likely long—client, partners, the legal system, the other 
side, among others. 
VI. THE WISDOM PARADOX 
The final point that deserves emphasis is the importance of experience to 
practical wisdom.  Aristotle notes that genius is associated with youth, practi-
cal wisdom with age.86  We are used to seeing child prodigies in fields such 
as mathematics, but not so with wisdom.87 
This does not mean that wisdom is simply a function of getting old.  The 
 
 82. See MATTHEW B. CRAWFORD, SHOP CLASS AS SOUL CRAFT 124 (2009). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. (quoting Amy Gilbert, Vigilance and Virtue: In Search of Practical Wisdom, 2 CULTURE 6, 
8 (2008)). 
 85. See CRAWFORD, supra note 82 (noting that courts require lawyers to “place the interests of 
their clients before their own, and often find implicit in fee agreements a promise by the lawyer to 
exercise ordinary judgment, care, and diligence in the rendition of legal services”). 
 86. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 75, at 200–01 (explaining that wisdom is “believed to accompany 
certain periods of life, and that a certain age is said to bring wisdom and judgment”). 
 87. Id. at 194 (“[T]his is attested by the fact that a young man may become proficient in geometry 
or mathematics and wise in these matters, but cannot possibly, it is thought, become prudent.  The 
reason of this is that prudence deals with particular facts, with which experience alone can familiarize 
us; but a young man must be inexperienced, for experience is the fruit of years.”). 
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neuropsychologist Elkhonon Goldberg has written a fascinating account of 
the connection between wisdom and aging, The Wisdom Paradox.88  In his 
book, Goldberg contrasts two types of problem solving, one based upon sheer 
mental horsepower, involving calculation and computation, and the other a 
kind of pattern-recognition.89  The first he associates with intelligence, and the 
second, with wisdom.90 
He notes that as a young man, his powers of sheer mental energy and 
capacity were much greater, but that as he has gotten older, the pattern-recog-
nition mode of intelligence has emerged as more significant: “What used to 
be the subject of involved problem-solving has become more akin to pattern 
recognition.  I am not nearly as good at laborious, grinding, focused mental 
computations; but then again I do not experience the need to resort to them 
nearly as often.”91  He recounts being able in his twenties to follow a complex 
lecture in mathematics without taking notes, and to pass a test a few months 
later.92  In his mid-fifties, Goldberg admits, he would not attempt such a feat: 
“It’s simply too hard[.]”93 
But other things, Goldberg notes, have become easier:   
Frequently, when I am faced with what would appear from the out-
side to be a challenging problem, the grinding mental computation is 
somehow circumvented, rendered, as if by magic, unnecessary.  The 
solution comes effortlessly, seamlessly, seemingly by itself.  What I 
have lost with age in my capacity for hard mental work, I seem to 
have gained in my capacity for instantaneous, almost unfairly easy 
insight.94   
From his research in neuroscience, Goldberg concludes that as humans age, 
problem-solving becomes more a series of pattern recognitions rather than the 
creation of new, complex mental constructs.95  Decision-making also becomes 
a form of pattern recognition.  As our number of “cognitive templates” grows, 
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it becomes increasingly likely that any new situation we encounter will be 
covered by one of the templates we have already formed.96  This description 
coheres with the earlier description of practical wisdom as a kind of seeing. 
Matthew Crawford observes something similar in the development of ex-
pertise as a motorcycle mechanic: 
The experienced mind can get good at integrating an extraordinarily 
large number of variables and detecting a coherent pattern.  It is the 
pattern that is attended to, not the individual variables.  Our ability to 
make good judgments is holistic in character, and arises from re-
peated confrontations with real things: comprehensive entities that 
are grasped all at once, in a manner that may be incapable of explicit 
articulation.97   
This description, with only slight modification, could also be applied to depict 
the expert judgment of a skilled and savvy counselor of the law. 
Both Goldberg and Crawford, of course, are building upon insights had 
by Aristotle, who observed, “We ought to pay the same respect to the unde-
monstrated assertions and opinions of men of age and experience and pru-
dence as to their demonstrations.  For experience has given them a faculty of 
vision which enables them to see correctly.”98 
VII. BEYOND PLATITUDES 
But, we have to admit that when speaking about practical wisdom, it is 
difficult to get beyond platitudes.  This is partly because nearly everything we 
can say on the subject is only a partial truth.  Whatever we say, it seems, there 
is an important counterpoint pulling in the opposite direction. 
• Wisdom requires knowledge, but it cannot be reduced to a sys-
tem of knowledge. 
• Wisdom requires emotions such as sympathy, yet detachment is 
also necessary. 
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• Practical wisdom is concerned with action, but judicious inaction 
is sometimes the wisest course. 
• Being mindful and thorough are important, yet in The Principle 
of Psychology, William James defines “the art of being wise [as] 
the art of knowing what to overlook.”99 
Journalist Stephen S. Hall has described this as the “yin-yang to the idea that 
makes it difficult to pin down.”100 
Nevertheless, we should not let what we cannot say stand in the way of 
what we can.  The basic features of practical wisdom are clear, even if the 
exact details are not.  This may just be an irreducible feature of the subject 
matter.  Aristotle himself insisted that we cannot demand greater precision 
than an area of inquiry permits itself.101  Thus, we can say  
• that practical wisdom involves both intellect and character; 
• that it may not be codified into a system of rules; 
• that it differs from theoretical wisdom; 
• that it is situational; 
• and that it rests upon experience. 
VIII. LINCOLN’S PRACTICAL WISDOM 
Let me conclude by returning to Lincoln. 
It might seem anomalous to cite as an example of practical wisdom a case 
in which Abraham Lincoln contributed nothing to the success of his client’s 
cause, other than standing aside when demanded.  But the case illustrates 
many of Lincoln’s attributes of character and judgment that have defined him 
as the most captivating and inspiring figure in our nation’s history.  In reflect-
ing upon the Reaper Case, three things in particular are worth noting. 
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The first is the energy and preparation Lincoln put into the case.  Even 
when his co-counsel were paying no heed to his requests for information, Lin-
coln found a way—getting copies of the pleadings from the federal courthouse 
in Chicago, visiting the Manny factory—to prepare himself.  Indeed it is re-
markable that he even had the gumption to show up on the day of the hearing, 
ready for work, after being ignored by his co-counsel and having to learn the 
date and place from reading the newspaper. 
The second notable feature of Lincoln’s behavior is that rather than leav-
ing town in a huff after being rebuffed by Harding and Stanton, he stayed 
behind, to listen and learn.  Even when the other lawyers treated him with 
barefaced contempt, as little more than a country bumpkin, Lincoln showed a 
steady perseverance.  When the hearing was over, Lincoln told one of 
Manny’s partners, Ralph Emerson, that he was going to return home to “study 
law.”  When Emerson asked what he meant, Lincoln explained, 
For any rough-and-tumble case (and a pretty good one, too), I am 
enough for any man we have out in that country; but these college-
trained men are coming West. They have had all the advantages of a 
life-long training in the law, plenty of time to study and everything, 
perhaps, to fit them.  Soon they will be in Illinois . . . and when they 
appear I will be ready.102 
It would have been understandable for Lincoln to conclude that he had nothing 
to learn from such arrogant and haughty comrades who, after all, had invited 
him to join their team. 
Most impressive, however, was Lincoln’s long-term response to Harding, 
and especially Stanton’s, condescending dismissiveness.  It would have been 
entirely understandable for Lincoln to have never given these men a second 
thought, or to have refused to do so, after he was elected President.  But as 
Doris Kearns Goodwin so masterfully recounts in her book, Team of Rivals, 
Lincoln had the confidence and character to include his chief rivals in his inner 
circle.103  His primary competitors for the Republican presidential nomination 
in 1860, New York Senator William H. Seward, Ohio governor Salmon P. 
Chase, and the Missouri statesman Edward Bates, were all given a place in 
Lincoln’s cabinet: Seward as secretary of state, Chase as secretary of treasury, 
and Bates as attorney general.  As we might guess, each of these men viewed 
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themselves as the political and social superior to Lincoln, and in large and 
small ways let him know it, but Lincoln had the equanimity to surround him-
self with the best men he could find.  As Goodwin observes, “Every member 
of this administration was better known, better educated, and more experi-
enced in public life than Lincoln.  Their presence in the cabinet might have 
threatened to eclipse the obscure prairie lawyer from Springfield.”104  But over 
time, even Stanton, perhaps the most imperious of them all, “developed a great 
respect for the commander in chief and was unable to control his tears for 
weeks after the president’s death.”105 
This, concludes Goodwin, was the key to Lincoln’s political genius:  
[R]evealed through his extraordinary array of personal qualities that 
enabled him to form friendships with men who had previously op-
posed him; to repair injured feelings that, left untended, might have 
escalated into permanent hostility; to assume responsibility for the 
failures of subordinates; to share credit with ease; and to learn from 
mistakes. . . . His success in dealing with the strong egos of the men 
in his cabinet suggests that in the hands of a truly great politician the 
qualities we generally associate with decency and morality—kind-
ness, sensitivity, compassion, honesty, and empathy—can also be im-
pressive political resources.106 
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